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REQUESTS BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR MODIFICATION
OF CONSENT DECREES
PARTmS to litigation may effect a binding settlement of their dispute
without a full trial by negotiating a consent decree in private and then
presenting it to the court for approval. When entered by the court, the
decree has the same force as a decree entered after litigation.1 The use
of consent decrees presents significant advantages to all the parties. For
example, in the antitrust field the Government has used consent decrees
extensively in order to enforce the antitrust laws quickly and economi-
cally.2 The defendant has a similar interest in avoiding time-consuming
and costly litigation; also he may obtain a more lenient decree by not
forcing a trial.3 And in the antitrust field there is the added advantage
that consent decrees may not be used as prima facie evidence of the
defendant's guilt in subsequent treble damage suits.4
The terms of consent decrees often establish continuing restrictions
upon the future actions of the parties. Occasionally, however, a party
may become dissatisfied with the operation of the decree and will
request the court to modify or vacate. In the landmark decision of
United States v. Swift & Co.,0 the Supreme Court held that such modi-
fication, when contested, should be allowed only in rare instances.
The Swift case involved a consent decree which had dissolved an
alleged monopoly in the food industry. In order to prevent further
violations of the antitrust laws, the decree had placed significant re-
1. ANrusr Sucomia., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86T1 CONc., 1sT Suss., R.rsor
ON TEE CONsENT DacR.E PRocRA OF THE DEPARTzsENT OF JusCE 2-3 (Comm. Print 1959)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
2. Between 1935 and 1958 more than seventy per cent of all civil antitrust suits initiated
by the Justice Department were settled by consent decree. MELTON S. Gownrn;, TnE
CONsENT DECREE: ITS FoRmULATION AND USE 6 (Occasional Paper No. 8, Bureau of Business
and Economic Research, Michigan State University 1962); REPORT ix. For the advantages
of antitrust consent decrees to both the Government and private defendants, see GoLnar.o,
supra at S.
3. In negotiating antitrust consent decrees the Justice Department often seeks to include
provisions which it feels are in the public interest but which "go beyond what the law
requires." Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REV. 1139, 1232 (1952). But the Department has also con-
sented to decrees which included less than the law requires. As a result, the Department
has been severely criticized. REPORT 290-99. See generally GoLDnano, op. cit. supra note 2.
chs. IV, V.
4- Clayton Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
5. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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strictions upon the defendants' future activities. Twelve years later
the defendants sought modification, arguing that conditions had so
changed that the restrictions the decree imposed were "useless and
oppressive." 7 The district court allowed modification, but the Supreme
Court reversed. The Court acknowledged the district court's power
to modify a continuing injunction" but severely limited the circum-
stances under which that power should be exercised. According to Mr.
Justice Cardozo: "nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what
was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned."
Under the current interpretation of the rule of Swift, two require-
ments must be met. First, a defendant must demonstrate a change in
conditions.'0 This change-which may be one of fact or law'l-must
be such that "dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a
shadow' '1 2 so that the original need for the decree no longer exists. 10
Second, a defendant must show that he faces undue hardship should
the decree remain in force.14 This hardship must be "evoked by new
and unforeseen conditions"'5 and must be distinguished from hard-
ships which have been imposed in the public interest by the terms of
the decree. The latter hardships, having been accepted knowingly,
will not justify subsequent modification. 10
6. During this time the defendants unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the consent
decree as a jural device. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
7. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 113.
8. Id. at 114.
9. Id. at 119. FEn. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(5) permits a court to "relieve a party or his legal
representative" from a final judgment if it "is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." This rule is regarded as establishing a procedural
innovation only; it enacted existing substantive law. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F.
Supp. 885, 905 (N.D. I11. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961) (denying a second
attempt by Swift to obtain modification of the original consent decree). See 7 MooRE,
FEDanAL PRAcrcE 60.26(4) (2d ed. 1953).
10. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 906, 912 (N.D. 11. 1960).
11. Systems Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961).
12. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119.
13. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. at 904; United States v. Besser Mfg. Co.,
125 F. Supp. 710, 713 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
14. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. at 906, 912.
15. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119.
16. See United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. at 912.
The rule for modification of decrees of continuing effect in the state courts is similar
to Swift; a change in circumstances making the original decree unduly oppressive Is a
prerequisite for relief. See, e.g., Ozark Bi-Products, Inc. v. Bohannon, 224 Ark. 17, 21, 271
S.W.2d 354, 357 (1954); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 92, 95, 113
P.2d 689, 690 (1941); Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 237-38, 7 So.2d 143, 146 (1942);
Emergency Hosp. v. Stevens, 146 Md. 159, 166, 126 At. 101, 104 (1924); Weaver v. Missis.
sippi & Rum River Boom Co., 30 Minn. 477, 479, 16 N.W. 269, 269-70 (1883). Board of
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The policies underlying the Swift rule are easy enough to ascer-
tain. Re-examination of the original decree is thought to be an un-
productive expenditure of the limited resources of the judiciary, largely
involving a reassessment of matters supposedly considered by the en-
tering court. 7 Also, requests for modification place a considerable
burden of defense upon the parties opposed to such modification. And,
it must be remembered, the moving party has already had one chance
to fashion an acceptable decree. Finally, in many instances, the op-
posing parties will have relied upon the terms of the original decree.'8
To some extent, these are the same considerations that underlie the
doctrine of res judicata. In fact, the Swift test may be viewed as a
branch of that broader doctrine. Two important differences, however,
should be kept in mind. Res judicata normally applies to separate and
subsequent proceedings while the Swift test governs the reopening
of a proceeding over which the court has continuing jurisdiction. And
res judicata, when applicable, is usually considered an absolute pro-
hibition against the reconsideration of issues previously adjudicated.10
In the case of a decree of continuing effect to which the Swift rule
applies, the courts retain the inherent power to modify or vacate the
decree at any time.20
Supposedly the Swift case established a comprehensive test covering
all requests for modification by private parties and by the Govern-
ment.2  When the request for modification is made by a private party
County Comm'rs v. Scott, 178 Neb. 53, 54-55, 131 N.W.2d 711, 712 (1964); Johnson &
Johnson v. Weissbard, 11 N.J. 552, 555-56, 95 A.2d 403, 405 (1953); People v. Scanlon, 11
N.Y.2d 459, 462, 184 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1962); 46 So. 52d St. Corp. v. Mfanlin, 404 Pa. 159,
160, 172 A.2d 154, 155 (1961); Ladner v. Siegal, 298 Pa. 487, 497, 148 Ad. 699, 702 (1930);
Uvalde Paving Co. v. Kennedy, 22 S.W.2d 1091, 1092 (Tex. 1929). A state court may grant
modification more liberally when the decree limits the exercise of a right guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment, such as union picketing. See Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 964,
235 S.W.2d 45, 51 (1950). The federal courts make a similar exception in such cases. See
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941).
17. Cf. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119; 7 Moom, op. dt. supra note 9,
at 288.
18. See JA1ms, Cn, PROCEDu E § 11.1, at 517-18 (1965). The degree to which a private
defendant can rely upon the consent decree would seem to be significantly related to the
attractiveness of such a decree as an alternative to litigation. One advantage of the Swift
rule is that, where applicable, it makes the decree in question relatively permanent. But
if this reliability is decreased, as by a more lenient test for modification when requested
by the Government, it is not unreasonable to assume-as we in fact do-that in future
cases defendants will be less willing to join the Government in a consent decree. This of
course would reduce the efficacy of the Government's consent decree program.
19. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
20. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 114; JA.ms, op. cit. supra note 18, § 11.8.
21. The Supreme Court's decision in Swift
... has been cited as authoritative in more than one hundred subsequent decisions,
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the Swift rule is in fact almost universally applied.22 There is nothing
in the Court's language in Swift to suggest that the Government stands
on a different footing than a private party. But several Supreme Court
cases cast some doubt upon the supposition that the Swift test is an ac-
curate statement of present law with regard to Government motions
for modification.
23
The most recent of these cases is Columbia Artists Management,
Inc. v. United States,24 which was decided in May of 1965. A consent
decree had previously been entered against Columbia and another
firm which managed professional concert artists and against two con-
cert services affiliated with the two management firms.2 5 The decree
both in the lower courts and by the Supreme Court itself. Nothing has been decided
since to cast doubt on its continued vitality or to limit its scope.
United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1960). The Government has
sought modification only infrequently. However, many commentators assume that It as
well as private parties is bound by the Swift rule or by a similar strict hardship test.
GOLDBERG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6-7; Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective
an Umbrella, 68 YALE L.J. 1391, 1392-93 (1959); Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent Decrees,
9 ANTrrRusr BULL. 673, 682 (1964); Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal
to the Antitrust Division, 56 Micm. L. REv. 1051, 1054-62 (1958); Comment, 55 Mimli. L.
REv. 92, 97 (1956); Comment, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 367, 369-72 (1960); Note, 58 CALIF. L.
Rxv. 627, 634 (1965). On the other hand, a few commentators have suggested that the test
for the Government has been relaxed. RFPORT 4; Duncan, Post-Litigation Resulting from
Alleged Non-Compliance with Government Antitrust Consent Decrees, 8 W. RES. L. REy.
45, 48-49 (1956); Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASh. & LEE
L. REv. 39, 45 (1961). The Swift test was specifically applied to the Government In United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942).
22. E.g., United States v. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 235 F. Supp. 378 (ND.
Cal. 1964) (consent decree); United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
77,062 (D.C. Utah) (consent decree); United States v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 178
F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (consent decree). United States v. International Boxing
Club, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (litigated decree); United States v, Besser Mfg.
Co., 125 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Mich. 1954) (litigated decree).
The application of the Swift test to litigated as well as consent decrees may be justified
on the grounds that, despite differences in their formulation, litigated and consent decrees
are of identical legal effect. See Isenbergh & Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement through Con-
sent Decrees, 53 HARV. L. R1v. 386, 388 (1940). In Swift itself, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated
that the rule applied to both types of decrees. 286 U.S. at 114.
23. The following analysis is primarily focused upon the Government's efforts to ob.
tain modification of consent decrees. The Government has rarely sought modification of a
litigated decree. See note 56 infra. Nevertheless, many of the same considerations apply to
both litigated and consent decrees, and, to that extent, conclusions drawn in terms of the
latter are generally applicable in the case of the former.
24. 381 U.S. 348 (1965).
25. United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70,380
(S.D.N.Y.).
The two original manager firms were Columbia Artists, Inc. and National Concert and
Artists Corporation. After the original consent decree had been entered, Summy-Birchard,
Inc. acquired and carried on the business of NCAC, but was subject to the terms of the
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allowed Columbia to use a standard contract which all concert services
booking Columbia artists were required to sign.2 Subsequently, the
other management firm objected to Columbia that the contract per-
mitted illegal resale price maintenance because it permitted Columbia
to dictate both the artist's fee and the margin retained by the concert
service. Fearing a suit by its competitor, Columbia petitioned the dis-
trict court to approve its standard contract, arguing that the contract
was specifically authorized by the consent decree.2- The district court
refused to approve the contract, holding that "insofar as the decree-
imposed requirement of margin operates to allow Columbia to set
resale prices, the decree is illegal and void as contrary to the letter and
policy of the Sherman Act."28 At Columbia's request the district court
permitted reargument on its "construction" of the decree. At the
reargument the Government, which had previously argued that the
decree as a successor in interest. The concert services affiliated with Columbia Artists and
Summy-Birchard were Community Concerts, Inc. and Civic Concerts, Inc., respectively.
Concert services organize local, non-profit audience associations, which are created and
maintained by their members for the purpose of presenting annual concert series. Among
its other functions, a concert service will book concert artists to perform at these local
concert series. The concert service collects the artist's fee from the audience association and
then pays it to the artist's manager, deducting a percentage therefrom called the margin
for its own services. Statement as to Jurisdiction for Appellant, pp. 2, 4, 5, Columbia
Artists Management, Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348 (1965).
26. The Standard Contract provided in part as follows:
It is agreed that this contract for the appearance of [name of Artist] is solely for
the purposes of an engagement on the organized concert series in [toin] for [dates]
at the fee of $ per engagement provided for in Columbia listings....
Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-4, Columbia Artists Management, Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S.
348 (1965).
27. Paragraph VI of the original consent decree provided:
Each defendant is enjoined and restrained from:
(A) Refusing to make available any artist managed by the defendant to any financially
responsible audience association at the same fee charged by such artist to compar-
able audience associations where the artist is reasonably available for the desired
performance....
(D) Refusing to making available to any financially responsible concert service any
artist managed by such defendant and reasonably available for the desired per-
formance, at the same margin allowed to the defendant or its affiliated concert
services by that artist for a performance for the same fee. (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70,830, at 70,833
(SD.N.Y.).
Columbia also contended that the offending provisions were required by a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the manager firms and the concert artists* union. Brief for Ap-
pellant, pp. 2-3, op. cit. supra note 26.
28. United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 78,800, aB'd
on rehearing, 1964 Trade Cas. 79,265 (S.D.N.Y.). But see the dissent to the Supreme Court's
decision suggesting that Columbia's standard contract may not in fact have been unlawful.
381 U.S. at 352.
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whole controversy surrounding Columbia's original petition was a
sham, now asserted that the court's initial construction of the decree
was correct.29 The district court reaffirmed its earlier decision. 0
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Columbia argued that the district
court had actually modified the decree by nullifying the clear meaning
of one of its provisions. The Government argued for affirmance, con-
tending that the district court had merely "construed" the decree.81
In a one sentence per curiam opinion the Court affirmed the judgment
below. 2 Unfortunately, due to the brevity of the Court's opinion the
grounds for the Columbia decision remain unclear. As the dissent
filed by Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Gold-
berg points out, the Government's contention that the lower court had
merely construed the consent decree is unsound. 8 Indeed, even the
District Judge who declared Columbia's contract illegal recognized
that the contract's terms were completely consistent with the original
consent decree.34 Consequently, it is possible to interpret Columbia
as allowing a modification of a consent decree without any showing
of change of fact or law." If this interpretation is correct, the Columbia
decision would support the proposition that when the Government
urges the modification of a consent decree, the strict requirements
of United States v. Swift & Co. need not be met.
Several of the Court's pre-Columbia decisions may also be read to
suggest that the Swift rule does not apply to motions made by the
Government. The question was first raised in the so-called auto finance
casesA6 In 1938 the Chrysler Corporation and the Ford Motor Com-
pany had consented to decrees requiring them and their affiliated auto
finance companies to separate and to cease certain discriminatory prac-
tices. These decrees were to lapse in 1941 if by then the Government
29. 1964 Trade Cas. at 79,266 (S.D.N.Y.). In the course of reargument the other manager
firm abandoned its contention that Columbia's standard contract was unlawful, but the
court found that the position taken by the Government preserved the adversary character
of the proceedings. Ibid.
30. 1964 Trade Cas. 79,265 (S.D.N.Y.).
31. Brief for Appellant, pp. 7, 9, op. cit. supra note 26.
32. United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 381 U.S. 348 (1965).
33. Id. at 350-53. On other occasions the Supreme Court has refused to change a decree
under the guise of "interpreting" its terms. United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360
U.S. 19, 23-24 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1952).
34. "[T~he decree clearly envisions that the artist or his manager will be able to control
the ultimate price paid by the ... audience association." 1963 Trade Cas. 78,796, at 78,799
(S.D.N.Y.).
35. The dissenters gave the majority's decision this interpretation. 381 U.S. at 352.
36. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942); Ford Motor Co, v. United
States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
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did not obtain a final judgment in an auto finance suit it was litigating
against General Motors.3 7 By that date no conclusion to the General
Motors suit was in sight. Nevertheless, both Ford and Chrysler agreed
to an extension of the decrees. But when the Government requested
a further extension in 1942, Chrysler objected. In Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the extension granted by
the district court over Chrysler's objections was proper:
We think the test to be applied in answering this question is
whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic
purpose of the original consent decree.3
Although Swift was cited in support of this decision, the Court allowed
a modification without any showing that there were sufficient changes
to satisfy the Swift test. But in 1948, when Ford also objected to a
further extension of the decrees, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had
dissented in Chrysler, wrote the majority opinion in Ford Motor Co.
v. United States, a 4-3 decision denying the United States' request.
The majority held that the Government had not shown "good cause"
why the court should release it from the terms of its own agreement.39
Though the Ford decision did not specifically relate its "good cause"
criterion to the requirements of United States v. Swift & Co., some com-
mentators have analyzed the second auto finance case as a return to the
strict test for modification.40 But Ford did not settle the issue. In
1959 a House Subcommittee on Antitrust reported that the test for
modification, when urged by the Government, had been relaxed and
was in fact the test used in Chrysler v. United States.41 This opinion,
which was urged on the Subcommittee by the Justice Department,
42
37. The Chrysler and Ford consent decrees also provided for modification of their terms
if the G.M. suit resulted in a less restrictive decree. 316 U.S. at 558; 335 U.S. at 307 n.1,
310-11.
Consent decrees sometimes include such provisions, which purport to allow modification
or dissolution under different or less restrictive conditions than the courts are thought
normally to require. For examples of such decrees, see 2 TR&Dz RrEc. Rr-. 8342 (1965);
Dabney, supra note 21, at 1396 n.22. The Government does not appear to have benefited
from this type of provision. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693
(1927); Kramer, supra note 21, at 1061. But defendants have occasionally fared smewhat
better. United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. 72,784 (1956);
Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1944); Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, discussed in text accompanying note 39 infra.
38. 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
39. 335 US. 303, 322 (1948).
40. Comment, 32 RocKY AFT. L. Rev. 367, 371-72 (1960); Comment, 55 Mci. 1. REv.
92, 97 (1956).
41. REaORT 4.
42. Id. at 5.
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rests upon an interpretation of two additional cases, Hughes v. United
States43 and Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United States.44 In both cases,
district courts had, at the Government's request, granted substantial
modification of consent decrees, and in both the Supreme Court re-
versed on procedural grounds. But in a dictum in the Hughes decision
the Court indicated the conditions under which such modification
would be proper. The Court did not specifically refer to either the
Chrysler or the Ford decisions. But it suggested that modification of an
antitrust consent decree is proper "where necessary to preserve com-
petition and to prevent monopoly. '45 If meaningful at all, this dictum
is more consistent with the liberal test enunciated in Chrysler than the
rule of United States v. Swift & Co. The Court later followed the
Hughes decision in Liquid Carbonic.46
After the Hughes and Liquid Carbonic cases, the Supreme Court did
not again consider the test for the Government until its ambiguous
Columbia decision. Consequently, there is today no clear statement of
what the applicable test is. The Supreme Court has never stated that the
strict Swift rule does not apply to the Government. Nonetheless, at
least four of the Court's five relevant decisions indicate, albeit in an
ambiguous fashion, that Government motions for modification might
be judged by a more lenient standard. At the very least, the ambiguity
of the cases indicates an uneasiness on the part of the Court to apply
a strict test to the Government.
In light of the general application of the Swift test to private party
motions, a less strict test for the Government hardly seems to be
even-handed justice. At first glance, it would seem that the policy
considerations thought to underlie the Swift rule-such as the conserva-
don of judicial resources-are equally applicable to government and
private parties. It might be argued that, as a practical matter, the Gov-
ernment is less likely to make unwarranted or frivolous requests for
modification. But even if correct, this argument is not the most satis-
factory basis for distinguishing between private and government re-
quests for modification. The question then arises whether there are in
43. 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
44. 850 U.S. 869, affirming, 123 F. Supp. 653 (1954).
45. 342 U.S. at 357.
46. 350 U.S. 869 (1954) (per curiam). The Justice Department clearly stretched a point
in arguing before the House Subcommittee that Liquid Carbonic had established a relaxed
test for the Government. The main holding of the Hughes decision was that substantial
modification of a consent decree is improper without an adequate hearing on the merits.
342 U.S. at 357-58. It was for this rule, not the dictum concerning the standards for modi-
fication, that Hughes was followed in Liquid Carbonic. Cf. Dabney, supra note 21, at
1394 n.15.
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fact significant policy considerations which, though ignored under the
Swift rule, might compel a more liberal modification test in certain
situations.
The view that Swift applies to both the Government and to private
parties rests in large part upon a contractual analysis of consent
decrees. Although the commentators recognize that a consent decree
is not a contract but a judicial act, the majority of the commentators
nevertheless seem to place great emphasis upon the contractual under-
pinnings of the consent decree.47 Indeed, the terms of a consent decree
are negotiated in private between the parties before being presented
for court approval.48 Furthermore, in most cases, the courts play only
a ceremonial role in the process, approving the terms of the decree as
a matter of course.4 9 The view that a consent decree reflects the give
and take of a bargaining process and is "in the nature of a solemn
contract" upon which the parties have a right to rely 0 leads to the con-
clusion that the parties must be equally bound by its terms. Conse-
quently, it is argued, both the Government and private defendants must
satisfy the strict requirements of Swift before modification will be al-
lowed.51
There are, however, important difficulties with over-emphasizing
the contractual elements of consent decrees. Generally, the objective of
consent decrees to which the Government is a party is to secure enforce-
ment of federal law in an economic manner. The very authority of a
court to enter the decree is supposedly dependent upon a determina-
tion by the court that the terms proposed by the parties are in the
public interest. 2 But does it make sense to bind the Government, and
ultimately the public, to a continuing decree which may no longer be (or
may never have been, for that matter) in the public interest? This is
precisely what may happen under a rigid contractual approach, for
47. E.g., GOLDBERG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19; Kramer, supra note 21, at 1058.
48. Phillips, supra note 21, at 40.
49. GOLDBERG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20-21; REPORT 14; Jinkinson, supra note 21.
at 676.
50. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., I F.R.D. 424, 426 (N.D. Ohio 1910) [quoting
12 C.J. Consent Decree (1917)].
51. See Comment, 55 Mzcf. L. R-v. 92, 95-95 (1956); Peterson, Consent Decrees: A
Weapon of Anti-trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 34, 40 (1950). for a discussion
of this view. As noted earlier, supra note 3, the Justice Department seeks to include in
antitrust consent decrees more extensive relief than a court could properly grant in a
similar litigated case. Supposedly, only a contractual approach could justify such provi-
sions; since a court under the antitrust laws could not impose them upon the defendant,
they are only enforceable if the defendant binds himself. Cf. Comment, supra, at 95.
52. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942); Op-
penheim, supra note 3, at 1233.
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the consent decree-which finds its main justification in its service
to the public interest (by securing adherence to federal laws at mini-
mum cost)-may be turned into an inflexible device whereby the
Government is bound permanently to an agreement which is actually
detrimental to the public interest. This point is amply illustrated by
the Columbia litigation. Had the Court not allowed modification, a
flawed but iron-bound consent decree would have permitted Columbia
to dictate artists' resale prices.
Another objection to the contractual approach is that it emphasizes
and legitimates a practice which undermines the court's responsibilities
in formulating and entering consent decrees. Theoretically, before
entering a consent decree the court should scrutinize the terms of the
agreement. For example, in the case of an antitrust consent decree, a
court should "satisfy... [itself] that the agreement does justice between
the industry and the public."5 3 But, as noted earlier, the courts rarely
carry out their responsibility. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
courts leave the entire process to the Government and enter consent
decrees as a matter of course, without making an independent deter-
mination of the decree's merit. 54
At this point, the pernicious consequences of applying the Swift test
to the Government should become apparent. If it were true that courts
adequately examine consent decrees before entering them, then the
Swift rule might not be unreasonable. Unless conditions have changed
unforeseeably, Swift would prevent a second court from re-examining
a matter actually considered by the entering court (although the argu-
ment that the public should not be bound by a bad decree might still
apply). But since courts generally play only a formal role in entering
consent decrees, the strict application of the Swift test to the Govern-
ment may create a situation whereby the public will be bound to a
faulty or inadequate consent decree which has never been subjected
to independent judicial scrutiny.
In a utopian world with unlimited judicial resources the ideal
solution might be to insist that courts entering consent decrees actually
fulfill their theoretical responsibilities. However, such a solution is un-
realistic. The perfunctory manner with which courts enter consent
53. HAMILTON & TmtL, ANTITRUST IN AcTION 88 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1941).
54. On rare occasion, the courts have played an active role in consent decree proceed-
ings. Thus, in two cases, courts entered consent decrees without the Government's consent,
United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wise. 1962); United
States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 72,140 (S.D. Ga.). And in another,
a court refused to enter a consent decree and ordered the parties to go to trial, United
States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 75,138 (S.D.N.Y.).
[Vol. 75:657
MODIFICATION OF CONSENT DECREES
decrees is largely dictated by the pressure of crowded dockets and by
the lack of an adversary presentation of the decree's merits and de-
fects.55 In addition, the very raison d'9tre of the consent decree lies in
its utility in concluding disputes in a quick and economic manner.
Clearly, any requirement that courts undertake a thorough examina-
tion of consent decrees at the point of entrance would greatly diminish
the practical value of such decrees.
Instead of making unrealistic demands upon the courts, a better
solution is to recognize existing conditions. Rather than insist that
courts examine thoroughly every consent decree presented for approval,
we should permit them to continue to rely upon the Government's
judgment when entering such decrees. But if the Government later
requests modification on the grounds that the decree does not operate
in the public interest, then a court should not be barred from consid-
ering the merits of the Government's request and granting modification
in appropriate cases. Not only is this the point when judicial attention
is most needed, it is also the point when judicial supervision can be
most effective, for the court will be able to exercise a more informed
judgment than at the time the decree was entered. The court need not
guess at the effect the terms of the decree will have. The effect will be a
matter of record.
The foregoing analysis indicates that modification requests made by
the Government should be judged by a more lenient test than the Swift
rule.58 This is because the Swift test is unresponsive to a number of
55. See GoLDBERG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20-21; HAMLTON & TiLL., op. cit. supra note
53, at 88.
56. The few cases in point suggest that a more lenient test than Swift has been applied
when the Government requests modification of litigated decrees. In one case a district court
modified the terms of a litigated decree, stating that "the determinative test is whether such
modification is reasonably necessary to effectuate the basic purposes of the decree." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 124 F. Supp. 573, 590 (D.D.C. 1954)-an apparently lib-
eral test which virtually paraphrases the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chrysler
Corp. v. United States. See text accompanying note S8 supra. On appeal, however the Su-
preme Court held that some of the relief granted by the district court in the Gypsum case
was improper because it enlarged the scope of the decree beyond that of the issues adjudi.
cated. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). But the
Court approved the relief granted below which it felt more effectively enforced the terms
of the original decree. 352 US. at 464. Other cases in which courts appear to have con-
sidered modification requests in terms of the basic purpose test are United States v. Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 5 TRDaE Rro. RE. (1965 Trade Cas.)
71,352, at 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (modification requested by Government and defendant):
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 1957 Trade Cas. 73,474 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Government's motion for modification denied).
The basic purpose approach seems to be reasonable. Admittedly, one of the arguments
advanced in support of a permissive test for modification of consent decrees-the fact that
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important considerations which should affect a determination whether
modification, in a given case, is in the public interest. Foremost among
these is a concern with securing adequate enforcement of law. There
are other interests, too, which might indicate the necessity of modifica-
tion. For example, dissolution of injunctions against public officials
should be (and in fact is) granted as soon as the Government can show
that the need for the decree no longer exists. T This result, although
it may be permissible under a flexible reading of the Swift rule, is
properly attributable to the courts' sensitivity to the important public
interest in the unhampered operation of governmental units.08 What
is proposed, in short, is a test for modification requests which balances
the governmental interests favoring modification against the factors
underlying the Swift rule which militate against modification.5 As
courts enter such decrees in a perfunctory manner-is absent in tile case of litigated
decrees. Thus, in the absence of a wholly unforeseeable change in conditions (the first
requirement of Swift), modification of a litigated decree will entail some re-examination of
issues previously considered by the entering court. But, on the other hand, it must be
remembered that a court has continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the operation of an
injunctive decree. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 114; JANIES, op. Cit. supra note
18, at 548. Furthermore, the public's interest in adequate enforcement of the law Is Just
as compelling a consideration with respect to litigated as to consent decrees. In either case,
should the advantage of hindsight prove modification to be desirable, it makes little sense
to remain imprisoned within the confines of the original decree.
57. Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 602 (1923); see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 85 S. Ct. 1116,
1124 (1965).
58. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 S. Ct. 6, 7 (1965); Township of Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 622 (1946); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 n.3 (1932); Mathews
v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525-26 (1932); Porto Rico Tel. Co. v. Puerto Rico Communications
Authority, 189 F.2d 59, 41 (CA. Puerto Rico 1951); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624,
689 (D.C. Neb. 1962).
59. To be consistent, a similar balancing procedure should be followed in judging modi-
fication requests made by private parties. Essentially, the question before the court would
be whether the factors which militate against modification are outweighed by some public
interest which modification would serve. Excepting cases in which the exercise of first or
fourteenth amendment rights is restricted, see note 16 supra, a private party will only rarely
be able to demonstrate that a public interest will be significantly enhanced by allowing
modification. But see American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917).
Usually, such a party will only be able to argue that removal of the restrictions of the
original decree will allow it to operate more efficiently and perhaps more profitably. Ad.
mittedly, increased efficiencies in the private sector of the economy are in the public
interest. But the important point is that such benefits are unlikely to outweigh the adverse
effects of permitting modification in such cases.
But see United States v. Little Rock Packing Co., 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1953); Tobin v.
Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951). In these cases the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
have taken the position that mere good faith compliance with the terms of a Fair Labor
Standards Act injunction provides sufficient grounds for its dissolution. Tobin v. Alma Mills,
supra, at 136. But other courts have specifically rejected this rule and adhered to the test
of United States v. Swift. Wirtz v. Graham Transfer & Storage Co., 322 F.2d 650, 651 (5th
Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Ross, 300 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1962); Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
242 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1957).
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noted earlier, these latter factors include the burden re-examination
places upon courts, the importance to prosecutors desirous of obtaining
consent decrees of maintaining the expectation that such decrees will
be reasonably stable, and considerations of fairness to private parties
who may have relied on a decree. 60
Although we accept the basic validity of the concerns underlying
Swift we do not think the court should accept them without inquiry in
each case. For example, under Swift the private party's reliance interest
was considered in gross. Whenever there was a decree the private party
opposed to modification was assumed to have some kind of reliance
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits follow the good faith rule because they believe that
FLSA injunctions work a hardship upon the enjoined employer, compare Mitchell v.
Helena Wholesale, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 101, 105 (E.D. Ark. 1958), with Wirtz v. Graham
Transport & Storage Co., supra, at 653, and because they feel that government by injunc-
tion is an undesirable form of social regulation. Tobin v. Alma Mills, supra at 136. How-
ever, these reasons do not justify a deviation from Swift. FLSA injunctions are issued only
after the court has decided that a permanent restraint is necessary to prevent further viola-
tions, cf., Walling v. Youngerman Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 421 (1945), or
after the defendant has voluntarily bound himself. Furthermore, the government by in-
junction to which the "good faith" courts object was specifically authorized by Congress.
Fair Labor Standards Act § 17, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1954). Finally, under
the lenient good faith compliance test, defendants would be encouraged to make repeated
motions to vacate outstanding injunctions, thereby increasing the burden of pending litiga-
tion upon the courts. For an example of the potential for abuse in the good faith rule, see
Goldberg v. Ross, supra.
60. Of course, one may argue that the Government's interest in modification should be
the only relevant interest to be considered by the court. Reliance by the private parties,
although an interest of some emotional appeal, is not one we usually allow to thwart law
enforcement. For example, when laws change, we usually do not listen to parties who claim
exemption based on reliance interests in the old law. See, e.g., Wisconsin & Mich. Ky. Co.
v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903). Neither, it can be argued, should we allow reliance to
thwart enforcement of a consent decree, especially since it is often doubtful that the
private party has sacrificed very much by consenting. This is particularly true in the case
of antitrust consent decrees to which defendants agree largely to avoid treble damage suits
which might arise if the Government successfully proved a violation of the antitrust laws.
To this extent, the argument of an antitrust defendant that he agreed to a consent decree
in order to obtain its specific terms and that any modification would constitute a sub-
stantial injury is, of course, weakened.
On the other hand, a one-sided approach considering only the Government's enforce-
mental interests is necessarily totally unresponsive to any of the considerations underlying
Swift, considerations which are of considerable merit. Such an approach would also tend to
destroy the utility of the consent decree device. Defendants would quickly find that they
had thrown themselves at the mercy of the Government, and whatever advantages they had
previously derived from consent decrees would pale by comparison. Furthermore, even if
one chooses to ignore all the practical advantages to defendants, to the Government and to
the courts which would be displaced by an exclusively enforcemental approach, there is one
further objection: consent decrees are instruments of the court, specifically a court acting in
equity. For such a court to ignore totally the interests and concerns of a private defendant
in favor of the Government would be wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the principles
upon which its authority is founded.
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interest. Our approach insists on a more discriminating inquiry. In
each case the court should determine how much the party would be
injured by the requested change, whether the change would injure
the party because he had been acting in reliance upon the decree or,
instead, because he had been acting totally independent of the decree,
and finally how legitimate the reliance was. As an illustration, suppose
a corporation is explicitly enjoined from following certain trade prac-
tices. No mention is made of allowable practices. When the number of
competitors within the industry drops off the Government seeks a
modified decree that will enlarge the list of forbidden practices. In
this case a reliance interest should not be found unless the private party
can show that (1) he had invested a substantial amount of money in
one of the new prohibited practices which would be lost because of the
change, (2) his investment was induced by the consent decree and
would not have been made without the decree, and (3) his reliance was
reasonable.6' In this case the party might not be able to make the
requisite showing. A change in a particular trade practice might not
necessarily cause a loss in a previous investment. The company prob-
ably would have instituted or continued the trade practice without the
decree. And it is probable that nothing in the decree or the Govern-
ment's action reasonably could have induced the private party to rely
on the legality of the practice. Suppose instead that the consent decree
specifically allowed a parent corporation to retain control of its sub-
sidiary.62 After a similar change in the competitive structure of the
industry the Government requests divestiture. In this case the corpora-
tion might be able to show a reliance interest more readily if, for
example, it had invested in the subsidiary, if the subsidiary had grown
and if, consequently, divestiture was more expensive. Here the injury
is real and is induced by a reasonable reliance on the decree. These
two examples merely illustrate some of the various kinds of factors
relevant to a determination of reliance. Our aim is only to suggest
that if reliance is to be balanced against the Government's interest in
modification, reliance should not be taken for granted. A real inquiry
should be made.6
3
61. For an analogous approach to reliance on a promise, see IA Coauw, CoNTRAMr
§ 205 (1963).
62. The Government agreed to such a decree in United States v. Western Electric Co.,
1956 Trade Cas. 71,135 (D.N.J.), and was subsequently heavily criticized for its decision.
See REPORT 290-94.
63. Of course, modification is never proper without an adequate hearing. Hughes v.
United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1952). Such a hearing requires the introduction of
evidence and judidally determined findings of fact. Ibid. In the course of such a hearing
the court should permit the parties to raise all the issues relevant to the modification
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Admittedly, the balancing approach suggested will permit modifica-
tion somewhat more readily than the Swift test. 4 (Although it should
be realized that, if past experience is any guide, modification is only
requested by the Government in a relatively small percentage of cases.)
But, at the same time, the suggested approach will eliminate one prac-
tice under the Swift test which may seriously undermine the rights of
those who oppose modification.0 5 The elimination of the rigid Swift
requirements will enable courts to modify unacceptable decrees with-
out resorting to the fiction that they are merely "construing" the
original decree. The law is clear that modification is improper without
a hearing on the merits. But if modification is disguised as construc-
tion (as the dissenters convincingly argued occurred in the Columbia
litigation), no such hearing is available, for the court's inquiry is
limited to the four corners of the decree in question. Freeing the courts
from the rigidity of the Swift rule frees them from using the fiction
of construction and insures those opposed to modification a hearing
on the real issues at stake.
requested. For example, an opponent to modification may wish to show that provisions in
the decree which at first glance seem unrelated to or unchanged by the proposed modifica-
tion will be significantly affected. Such hidden connections between apparently unrelated
aspects of a consent decree often arise as a result of the bargaining process by which such
decrees are formulated. A provision assented to by one party may have represented the
quid pro quo for a seemingly unrelated concession made by the other party. In, such a
case, a court might well permit the party opposing modification a hearing on such ques-
tions as whether the intent of the whole decree might fail without the term in question
or whether a specific term, though objectionable if considered alone, might be entirely
permissible when considered as part of the decree as a whole.
64. As noted above (see text accompanying notes 32-36 supra) it would be most difficult
to reconcile the Columbia decision with the Swift test. But Columbia is completely con-
sistent with the balancing approach. Although there had been no change in conditions
since the decree was entered, modification was justified because the decree permitted un-
lawful behavior. Similarly, under a balancing approach the Government might legitimately
obtain modification when there had been no change whatsoever except in Administration
attitude regarding antitrust policy-provided, of course, that the court is convinced, after
considering all the relevant factors, that the requested modification is in fact justified in
the public interest.
65. It may be argued that the suggested approach actually represents a clarification-
as opposed to an extension--of existing law. Columbia and the earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions which considered governmental requests for modification certainly reflect-but in an
unarticulated manner-the Court's solicitude for significant public interests. Two ancillary
advantages will result from a clear articulation of the balancing test for the Government:
First, the dominant importance of the public interest will be definitely established, disabus-
ing courts and commentators alike of the 'contractual' notion of the consent decree. Cf.
United States v. Carter Products, 211 F. Supp. 144, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 195). Second, a clear
statement of the conditions under which the Government may obtain modification will
enable priva-b parties contemplating such a decree to analyze more effectively the precise
risks and disadvantages which the consent decree, involves. It will introduce a note of cer-
tainty where confusion now exists.
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